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ARTICLE
Pragmatism over principle: US intervention and
burden shifting in Somalia, 1992–1993
Stefano Recchia
Department of Politics and International Studies (POLIS), University of Cambridge, UK
ABSTRACT
The conventional wisdom about the 1992 US intervention in Somalia is that it was a
quintessentially humanitarianmission pushed by President George H. W. Bush. This
article challenges that interpretation, drawing on newly declassiﬁed documents.
The Somalia intervention, I argue, was largely a pragmatic response to concerns
held by the US military. In late 1992, as the small UN mission in Somalia was
collapsing, senior American generals worried about being drawn into the resulting
vacuum. Hence they reluctantly recommended a robust US intervention, in the
expectation that this would allow the UN to assemble a larger peacekeeping force
that would take over within months. The intervention ultimately failed, but the
military learneduseful lessons from this experienceonhow to achieve smootherUN
handoﬀs in the future and thus eﬀectively shift longer-term stabilisation burdens to
the international community.
KEYWORDS Burden sharing; humanitarian intervention; peacekeeping; peace enforcement; bridging
operations; multinational operations; Powell doctrine
The conventional wisdom about Operation Restore Hope, the 1992 US inter-
vention in Somalia, goes as follows: First, this was a quintessentially humanitar-
ian mission driven by normative concerns, with no traditional US national
interests involved.1 Second, the intervention was pushed by President George
H.W. Bush, whowas personally aﬀected by the humanitarian tragedy.2 Third, to
the extent that strategic motives inﬂuenced the decision, American leaders
chose to intervene in Somalia in order to reduce pressure for US intervention in
Bosnia, which they thought would involve far greater risks.3
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This article was originally published with error. This version has been corrected. Please see Erratum
(http://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2018.1450111)
1Two classic statements of this are Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press 2003), 55; and Nicholas Wheeler, Saving Strangers (Oxford University Press 2000),
180.
2Peter Feaver, Armed Servants (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2003), 240; Robert DiPrizio,
Armed Humanitarians (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 2002), 52–54; Wheeler, Saving
Strangers, 180.
3Jon Western, ‘Sources of Humanitarian Intervention: Beliefs, Information, and Advocacy in the US
Decisions on Somalia and Bosnia’, International Security 26/4 (2002), 112–42; also Feaver, Armed
Servants, 241.
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New evidence presented in this article raises serious questions about all
three of these interpretations. First, declassiﬁed National Security Council
(NSC) documents indicate that the deployment of US troops to Somalia was
not driven primarily by humanitarian considerations. Instead, high-ranking
Bush administration oﬃcials were motivated by pragmatic concerns: senior
American generals, in particular, worried that because of prior US actions, if
the small United Nations Operation in Somalia (known as UNOSOM)
imploded under attacks from hostile militias, US troops might have to be
brought in to extract the UN peacekeepers. The United States might then be
left with primary responsibility for dealing with the famine and civil war,
without a clear exit strategy. The generals viewed an immediate US inter-
vention aimed at restoring a modicum of stability, followed by a handoﬀ to
a strengthened UN mission, as a preferable alternative. Second, the Somalia
intervention was not pushed by President Bush; instead, it was recom-
mended and indeed conceived by the US military under the leadership of
General Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staﬀ (JCS). Third, the
documents indicate that Bush initially envisioned Restore Hope as a short-
term operation of only a few weeks. But such a temporally limited operation
would have done little do diminish pressure for US intervention in Bosnia –
hence, the Somalia-for-Bosnia argument is problematic.4
In November 1992, UNOSOM was under siege, while tens of thousands of
Somalis remained at risk of starvation. General Powell thus recommended a
massive but temporally limited US intervention under national command to
facilitate the delivery of relief supplies and prevent a wholesale collapse of
the UN mission. The JCS expected that this would (a) allow the United States
to retain the initiative, minimising the risk to American forces, and (b) oﬀer
the UN the necessary breathing space to assemble a larger and more
capable peacekeeping force that would take over as soon as possible.
Powell persuaded Bush that this would be a low-risk course of action.
Consequently, Bush launched a large-scale US intervention that reﬂected
the military’s preferences in December 1992.
In the short run, Operation Restore Hope was able to somewhat stabilise
the situation and drastically reduce civilian deaths. But the transfer to UN
troops, formally completed in May 1993, was implemented too hastily: it
was driven by a political timetable in Washington more than by progress on
the ground, and US forces withdrew before the follow-on UN mission
(UNOSOM II) was fully staﬀed. To complicate matters, UNOSOM II’s ambi-
tious new enforcement mandate drew the ire of Somali warlords, resulting
in frequent attacks on the peacekeepers and increasingly turning the UN
into a belligerent in the country’s civil war. During the summer of 1993, US
4Western (‘Sources of Humanitarian Intervention’, 112–42), who ﬁrst formulated this argument,
provides no direct evidence to back it up.
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combat troops went back into Somalia to support the UN in its pursuit of
hostile militia leaders. The mission ended in failure after 13 American
soldiers were killed during the infamous ‘Black Hawk down’ incident in
October, which led ﬁrst US and then also UN authorities to mandate a
scaled withdrawal of all international forces.
A quarter century after Operation Restore Hope, the American military
continues to view this experience as a source of useful lessons.5 The failure
in Somalia increased the US military’s reluctance to deploy American com-
bat troops on humanitarian missions abroad. But it also appears to have
prompted signiﬁcant learning by the military as an organisation on how to
more eﬀectively hand oﬀ longer-term stabilisation to UN forces, should the
president order similar interventions in the future.
Scholars of individual and organisational learning have long pointed out
that experiences of failure, by challenging the status quo, produce a ‘learn-
ing readiness that is diﬃcult to produce without a felt need for corrective
action’.6 In line with this, after Somalia, the military’s attention was drawn to
previously overlooked challenges in implementing UN handoﬀs successfully,
prompting a search for solutions. In particular, the Somalia experience drove
home the importance of an integrated political–military eﬀort based on
clear benchmarks for measuring progress ahead of the transfer to UN forces.
As a result of learning from Somalia and from subsequent more success-
ful experiences elsewhere, the idea that handing oﬀ longer-term stabilisa-
tion to UN missions is a central component of the US exit strategy for
humanitarian interventions has become embedded in US military doctrine.
Current US Army doctrine, for instance, states that oﬃcers planning
humanitarian interventions should aim to ‘accomplish transfer of authority
[to follow-on multilateral missions] as early as possible. The timing of the
transfer [ought to be] part of the initial negotiations’.7
This article draws on recently declassiﬁed documents and interviews with
high-level policymakers to elucidate how the notion of UN handoﬀs as
central to the US exit strategy for humanitarian interventions ﬁrst emerged
during civil–military deliberations about Somalia in late 1992. The article also
clariﬁes the motives behind this intervention by tracing the decision-making
5See, e.g., Glenn M. Harned, Stability Operations in Somalia 1992–93: A Case Study (Carlisle, PA: US Army
War College Press 2016); and, more generally, William Flavin and Chiyuki Aoi, ‘US Military Doctrine
and the Challenges of Peace Operations’, in John Karlsrud, Cedric de Coning, and Chiyuki Aoi (eds.),
UN Peacekeeping Doctrine in a New Era (New York: Routledge 2017).
6Sim B. Sitkin, ‘Learning Through Failure: The Strategy of Small Losses’, in Barry M. Staw and L. L.
Cummings (eds.), Research in Organizational Behavior 14 (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press 1992), 238. See
also Dan Reiter, ‘Learning, Realism, and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past’, World
Politics 46/4 (1994), 490–526.
7US Department of the Army, ‘The Army in Multinational Operations’, Field Manual 3–16 (8 April 2014),
chap. 5, para. 14. On joint doctrine, see Joint Chiefs of Staﬀ, ‘Multinational Operations’, Joint
Publication 3–16 (16 July 2013), which discusses transitions to multilateral organisations such as
the UN in chap. 3, para. 32.
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process and analysing the positions of key actors. The ﬁrst section of the
article reviews US and UN policy on Somalia during the ﬁrst part of 1992,
highlighting the US military’s initial opposition to armed intervention.
The second section zeroes in on the Washington policy debate in
November 1992: I show that military leaders, in a stunning about-face,
abandoned their prior opposition to intervention and essentially recom-
mended a large-scale deployment of US combat troops. The third section
clariﬁes the inﬂuence of this recommendation on Bush’s decision to inter-
vene and elucidates the reasons behind the military’s change of heart. The
fourth section discusses key factors that resulted in ultimate mission failure,
before the conclusion returns to lessons learned.
Dealing with a complex humanitarian emergency
Somalia descended into a state of violent chaos in early 1991, after Cold War
superpower funding for longtime strongman Siad Barre dried up, his regime
collapsed, and various factions began to vie for control of the country’s
politics. Factional warfare destroyed the country’s agricultural production
and caused large-scale population displacement, yielding a humanitarian
crisis of massive proportions.8 By early 1992, more than 300,000 Somalis had
died from malnutrition; an additional 1.5 million faced an immediate risk of
starvation, and approximately 3000 were dying daily.9
The summer 1992 US food airlift and the ﬁrst ‘safe area’ proposals
Plenty of food aid had been stocked in Somalia by international relief
organisations. However, as aid convoys increasingly came under attack
from armed militias, delivering that food to hungry civilians became exceed-
ingly diﬃcult. In April 1992, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali
recommended that 500 armed peacekeepers be deployed to Somalia to
facilitate relief supplies in and around the capital, Mogadishu. The proposal
was welcomed by US oﬃcials at the Department of State (DOS), especially in
the Bureau for African Aﬀairs.10 However, senior policymakers at the White
House and the Department of Defense (DOD) were reluctant – not least
because under the UN’s assessed contribution system, the United States
would be responsible for 30 per cent of the mission’s ﬁnancial cost. Because
8Ioan Lewis and James Mayall, ‘Somalia’, in Mayall (ed.), The New Interventionism, 1991–1994
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996), 104–6; Herman J. Cohen, Intervening in Africa
(London: Macmillan 2000), 201–5.
9Boutros Boutros-Ghali, The United Nations and Somalia, 1992–1996 (New York: UN Department of
Public Information 1996), 5; Western, ‘Sources of Humanitarian Intervention’, 122.
10Western, ‘Humanitarian Intervention’, 123 n. 39; also John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, Somalia and
Operation Restore Hope (Washington, DC: USIP Press 1995), 37.
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of these hesitations in Washington, in the spring of 1992, only 50 UN
observers were dispatched to Somalia.11
The pressure on President Bush to support more serious international
action on Somalia grew over the summer. After the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) sent armed peacekeepers to Bosnia in June, Boutros-Ghali
bluntly criticised the West for caring only about the ‘rich man’s war’ in the
Balkans – drawing signiﬁcant media attention.12 Furthermore, in July, both
houses of the US Congress unanimously adopted a resolution calling for the
deployment of armed UN peacekeepers to Somalia to protect aid
deliveries.13 US presidential elections were scheduled for November 1992,
and persistent portrayals of the Bush administration as callous in the face of
massive suﬀering in Somalia could damage the president politically. It was
thus probably not a coincidence that on the eve of the 1992 Republican
National Convention, Bush announced several initiatives on Somalia.14
First, in late July, the administration oﬀered to support a UNSC resolution
authorising the deployment of 500 peacekeepers to Mogadishu, as recom-
mended by Boutros-Ghali. Shortly thereafter, Bush let it be known that US
aircraft would transport the peacekeepers to Somalia.15 The most important
US policy change came on 14 August, when the White House declared that
‘starvation in Somalia is a major human tragedy’ and announced that ‘the
United States will take a leading role’ by initiating a 145,000-ton emergency
food airlift to the country.16 The Pentagon’s concerns that the oﬀer to
transport the UN peacekeepers, combined with the food airlift, might put
the administration on a slippery slope toward US military intervention were
brushed aside on this occasion.17
The US food airlift, known as Operation Provide Relief, delivered tens of
thousands of tons of food to Somalia. However, it soon became apparent
that much of the food could not reach its intended beneﬁciaries because of
inadequate security along major highways and looting by armed gangs.18
Pro-intervention oﬃcials at the State Department consequently began to
11Paul Lewis, ‘Reined in by US, UN limits mission to Somalia’, Washington Post, 26 Apr. 1992. See also
Boutros-Ghali, UN and Somalia, 18–20; and Cohen, Intervening, 206–7.
12See, e.g., Keith Richburg, ‘Somalia’s Overshadowed Tragedy’, Washington Post, 12 Aug. 1992; and
Leonard Doyle, ‘Embarrassed UN Acts on Somalia’, The Independent (London), 30 July 1992.
13Cohen, Intervening, 208–9; Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope, 36.
14On how the presidential election campaign most likely inﬂuenced Bush’s policy change on Somalia in
the summer of 1992, see David Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace (New York: Touchstone 2001),
250–51; and Cohen, Intervening, 209.
15Nora Bensahel, ‘Humanitarian Relief and Nation Building in Somalia’, in Robert J. Art and Patrick M.
Cronin (eds.), The United States and Coercive Diplomacy (Washington, DC: USIP Press 2004), 26; James
L. Woods, ‘US Government Decisionmaking Process during Humanitarian Operations in Somalia’, in
Walter Clarke and Jeﬀrey Herbst (eds.), Learning from Somalia (Boulder, CO: Westview 1997), 155.
16‘Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on Additional Humanitarian Aid for Somalia’, White House,
14 August 1992, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=21334>.
17Walter S. Poole, The Eﬀort to Save Somalia: August 1992 – March 1994 (Washington, DC: Joint History
Oﬃce, Oﬃce of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staﬀ 2005), 8–9.
18Cohen, Intervening, 210; Boutros-Ghali, UN and Somalia, 24.
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ﬂoat the idea of establishing safe areas, or ‘zones of tranquility’, in rural
southern Somalia, to be guarded by small numbers of American ground
troops. The goal, they argued, would be to protect critical facilities such as
airports, feeding centres and key roads, keeping the militias away so that
food could be handed out to vulnerable populations.19 Yet military planners
on the Joint Staﬀ pushed back vigorously against the idea of deploying
small numbers of US troops to establish safe areas in Somalia, insisting 'that
it was just complete nonsense, that it wouldn’t work without muscular
military power behind it’.20
UN peacekeepers under ﬁre
As the security situation in Somalia gave no sign of improvement, on
28 August 1992, the UNSC authorised 3000 additional troops for UNOSOM.21
Several countries, including Belgium, Canada, Egypt, and Nigeria, oﬀered
troops.22 But Somalia’s most powerful warlord, Mohammed Aideed, had not
been consulted on this expansion of the UN force, and he reacted furiously. First,
he placed signiﬁcant restrictions on the deployment of the initial contingent of
500 Pakistani peacekeepers authorised by the UNSC in July, to which he had
previously given his consent. Second, he warned that any further, forcible
UNOSOM deployment would be met by violence.23
By October, the movement of relief workers in Somalia’s south had
become extremely diﬃcult because of constant harassment by armed mili-
tias, and US oﬃcials worried that ‘at most only half of the population
threatened with starvation [was] being reached’ by the airlift.24 On
12 November, Aideed upped the ante, demanding that the Pakistani batta-
lion that had managed to set up base at Mogadishu airport withdraw
completely. That same day, after UN authorities declared that they had no
intention of complying, the peacekeepers came under ﬁre.25
It now appeared unlikely that amere 3000 additional peacekeepers, without a
robustmandate and the capabilities to enforce it, would be able tomakemuch of
a diﬀerence on the ground – indeed, they might not even be able to deploy. A
secret CIA report warned US policymakers that the 12 November attack signalled
19Ken Menkhaus and Louis L. Ortmayer, ‘Key Decisions in the Somalia Intervention’, Pew Case Studies
in International Aﬀairs No. 646 (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown
University 1995), 4; Poole, Save Somalia, 10.
20Author interview with General Barry McCaﬀrey (director for strategic plans and policy, the Joint Staﬀ,
1992–94), 18 August 2016. See also Poole, Save Somalia, 10.
21UNSC Resolution 775, adopted on 28 August 1992. See also Boutros-Ghali, UN and Somalia, 26–7.
22Poole, Save Somalia, 31.
23Boutros-Ghali, UN and Somalia, 27–8; Bensahel, ‘Humanitarian Relief’, 26.
24DOS, ‘The Need for Action in Somalia’, discussion paper for the Deputies Committee [henceforth: DC],
(20 November 1992). [All US documents cited in this article have been released by the George H. W.
Bush Presidential Library pursuant to Mandatory Declassiﬁcation Reviews requested by the author].
25Boutros-Ghali, UN and Somalia, 28; Kenneth R. Rutherford, Humanitarianism under Fire: The US and UN
Intervention in Somalia (Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press 2008), 69–70.
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a signiﬁcant escalation of Aideed’s anti-UN campaign.26 The report predicted that
a decision ‘to try tomove aheadwith the [UN] deployment…will prompt Aideed
to escalate’; speciﬁcally, it ‘would probably spur him to bombard the airport and
Pakistani bivouac area in a bid to force an evacuation’.27 Deteriorating security
conditions and concerns that an evacuation of UNpeacekeepers under ﬁremight
have to be ‘done by US forces’,28 in a high-risk operation, set the stage for a
rethink of US policy.
US intervention seriously considered, November 1992
To fully understand the political importance of UNOSOM’s looming collapse
in late 1992, the broader context needs to be taken into account. The US
food airlift was increasingly ineﬀective; it was also very expensive and could
not be sustained indeﬁnitely. Earlier in the fall, under pressure from DOD,
the Bush administration had agreed to wind down the airlift and discon-
tinue it by the end of January 1993.29 That risked leaving the United States
with a policy vacuum that could become politically unsustainable if the
humanitarian crisis persisted – potentially saddling American forces with a
long-term stabilisation burden after the UN peacekeepers withdrew. As
Frank Wisner, the undersecretary of state for international security aﬀairs,
reminded his colleagues during an interagency meeting, America’s actions
up to that point – the food airlift and the transportation of UN troops to
Somalia – made it impossible for the United States to simply extricate itself:
‘One reason for why this is our problem is because of what we have done’.30
Senior military leaders had for months been resisting greater US involve-
ment, seeking to disabuse their more interventionist civilian colleagues in
the administration of the notion that American power could be used at little
cost to defuse or resolve the humanitarian crisis. Admiral Frank Bowman,
who was deeply involved in interagency deliberations on Somalia as the
director of political–military aﬀairs on the Joint Staﬀ, recalls that ‘There was a
whole lot of pushback from the combatant commanders, [who argued] that
this would result in a quagmire, with us getting bogged down’.31 Secretary
of Defense Richard Cheney, too, ‘was reluctant’ and ‘a little nervous’ about
the eagerness of some DOS oﬃcials to commit US military assets.32 For most
of 1992, the Pentagon’s advice to limit America’s commitment had found
26Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], ‘Somalia: The Threat to the UN’s Pakistani Battalion in Mogadishu’,
memorandum (18 November 1992), 1.
27Ibid., 2.
28Ibid., 4.
29DOS, ‘The Need for Action in Somalia’, 2.
30‘Minutes for the DC Meeting on Somalia’ (20 November 1992), 3.
31Author interview with Admiral Frank L. Bowman (director for political–military aﬀairs, the Joint Staﬀ,
June 1992–July 1994), 27 April 2011.
32Richard B. Cheney, ‘Oral history interview transcript’, Miller Center, University of Virginia,
16 March 2000, <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-oral-histories/richard-b-cheney-
oral-history-secretary-defense>.
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receptive ears among the president’s inner circle at the White House.
However, by mid-November, it was clear that the previous US policy of
supplying humanitarian aid while essentially letting the UN deal with the
political situation on the ground was no longer viable.
Bush says, ‘You’ve got to do something’ – but does not push for
intervention
President Bush’s senior foreign policy team at the time included National
Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft; Secretary of Defense Cheney; JCS
Chairman Powell; and Lawrence Eagleburger, the acting secretary of state.
Bush’s own recollection is that he decided to explore options for more
vigorous action on Somalia after losing the presidential election to Bill
Clinton on 3 November 1992. As Bush and his wife were watching television
around mid-November and saw images of ‘those starving kids’, the presi-
dent summoned General Powell and Secretary Cheney to the White House
and told them, ‘I – we – can’t watch this anymore. You’ve got to do
something’.33
However, Bush did not tell Powell and Cheney that he wanted to see a US
military intervention. Powell says he ‘vividly’ remembers the mid-November
White House meeting, at which Bush made it clear he ‘wanted to do some-
thing’; but Powell insists that neither the president nor Scowcroft appeared
‘anxious to send American soldiers to Somalia’; in fact, ‘they were reluctant
to get into it’.34 Admiral David Jeremiah, Powell’s deputy at the time,
conﬁrms that Bush was not driving policy on the issue of US intervention.35
With the exception of the 14 August decision on the food airlift, which
had been taken by the president with little prior consultation, the develop-
ment of US policy options on Somalia was left to oﬃcials below cabinet
level in the NSC’s Deputies Committee. The deputies had been meeting
regularly on Somalia through 1992, but without much urgency.36 In late
November, the discussion among the deputies at last became more focused
and crystallised around two options: ﬁrst, a signiﬁcantly enlarged UN peace-
keeping operation involving at least 15,000 troops, with US logistical sup-
port but without active US participation; second, a US-led coalition
operation under national command. Because of the presumption of
33Quoted in Cragg Hines, ‘Pity, Not US Security, Motivated Use of GIs in Somalia, Bush Says’, Houston
Chronicle, 24 October 1999. Menkhaus and Ortmayer (‘Key Decisions’, 6) also indicate that Bush asked
his staﬀ to outline US policy options ‘two weeks after his election defeat’.
34Author interview with General Colin Powell (JCS chairman, 1989–93), 1 May 2017.
35Asked whether Bush was driving policy on this, Jeremiah’s answer is unequivocal: ‘He was not’. David
Jeremiah, ‘Oral history interview transcript’, Miller Center, University of Virginia, 15 November 2000,
<https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-oral-histories/david-jeremiah-oral-history-
commander-paciﬁc-ﬂeet-vice>.
36Author interview with Admiral David Jeremiah (JCS vice chairman, 1990–94), 28 January 2011.
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continued JCS opposition to any deployment of US troops, the ﬁrst option
initially appeared more likely to garner the administration’s support.37
The DOS proposal for a strengthened UN force
US intelligence analysts had concluded by 10 November that the existing plan
to insert 3000 additional peacekeepers was ‘seriously ﬂawed’.38 Even if US
aircraft were able to transport the peacekeepers ‘into areas in which local
agreement has been obtained’, there was ‘a high likelihood that at least one
or another of the groups inserted by the United States…would [subsequently]
require evacuation from a potentially hostile situation’.39 The intelligence
community concluded that ‘a force far larger than the 3500 [500 + 3000]
currently envisaged… would be needed’.40 On 12 November, this same con-
clusion was adopted by the Policy Coordination Committee for Africa, an
interagency group of mid-level oﬃcials tasked with preparing the agenda for
the deputies.41
Over the next several days, Undersecretary of State Wisner secured
Eagleburger’s blessing for a ‘much stronger US leadership role in pressing
the UN to mount a credible security force in Somalia’.42 Wisner and Boutros-
Ghali, who were personally acquainted from the former’s time as US ambas-
sador to Egypt, then began to discuss various options for a signiﬁcantly
enlarged UN peacekeeping operation of between 15,000 and 20,000 troops,
with robust rules of engagement.43
In preparation for a deputies meeting scheduled for 20 November, Wisner
and his team at DOS prepared a detailed policy proposal. Their recommen-
dation was that the administration ‘oﬀer to work with [Boutros-Ghali] to put
together a coalition of nations prepared to participate in… a much larger
force’.44 The DOS proposal noted that there was ‘no need at this point to
commit US ground troops to such an operation’ (the United States would
only provide logistical support) – a qualiﬁcation that seemed intended to
make the proposal acceptable to DOD and especially the JCS.45
37Author interview with John Ordway (director for African Aﬀairs, NSC staﬀ, 1992–93), 26 August 2016.
See also Cohen, Intervening, 210–12; and Western, ‘Humanitarian Intervention’, 135.
38National Intelligence Council, ‘Can United Nations Forces Successfully Carry Out Their Mission in
Somalia?’, Memorandum No. 00310/92 (10 November 1992), 2.
39Ibid. 3–4.
40Ibid., 2.
41DOS, ‘The Need for Action in Somalia’, 2. See also Poole, Save Somalia, 16.
42See John M. Ordway, ‘Memorandum for [Deputy National Security Adviser] Jonathan Howe’, White
House, National Security Council staﬀ, 19 November 1992.
43Hirsch and Oakley, Restore Hope, 41; Rutherford, Humanitarianism, 73.
44DOS, ‘The Need for Action in Somalia’, 3. According to former assistant secretary of state Herman
Cohen (Intervening, 210), it was Boutros-Ghali who ‘proposed to Wisner… a major armed
intervention’.
45DOS, ‘The Need for Action in Somalia’, 3.
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DOD’s counter-proposal: US-led operation followed by UN handoﬀ
The deputies met at 11.00 a.m. on 20 November 1992 to discuss US policy
options on Somalia. Participants included Jonathan Howe (who chaired the
meeting as the deputy national security adviser); Undersecretary of State
Wisner and Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Herman Cohen; Paul
Wolfowitz, the Pentagon’s undersecretary for policy; and General Barry
McCaﬀrey for the JCS.46 Several previous accounts erroneously claimed
that Admiral Jeremiah, the JCS vice chairman, represented the military at
the meeting,47 but on this occasion, Jeremiah was replaced by McCaﬀrey,
the Joint Staﬀ’s director for strategic plans and policy.
The discussion initially focused on the DOS proposal. Wisner began by
reminding his colleagues that ‘the number dying is increasing
dramatically’.48 He then related that ‘in discussions with the UN, I have
been struck that they see the need to… [deploy] a force up to 15,000–-
20,000, perhaps inserted without permission’.49
After Wisner had presented his case, Howe, the deputy national
security adviser, asked, ‘If the UN gets in trouble and needs reinforce-
ment, are we willing to do that, even at some risk to our people’?50
Wolfowitz seized on this question to voice his doubts about Wisner’s
proposal, which, he feared, could result in American forces being drawn
in later, under more challenging circumstances. ‘I am worried that this is
[a] band aid’, he aﬃrmed. ‘If we get involved with big resource implica-
tions, and there is “no US role for ground forces”, that might shift if it
doesn’t work’.51 The DOS proposal, he continued, ‘will be costly and [is]
likely to suck us in on the ground’.52 Instead of considering such risky
half measures, Wolfowitz suggested, ‘we need to look at a serious use of
force if we are serious’.53
McCaﬀrey spoke next. The general began by noting that he had ‘instruc-
tions from his senior leadership’, thus making it clear that what he was
going to say had been cleared with Chairman Powell.54 ‘Paul Wolfowitz
captured the tone’, McCaﬀrey said. In order to deliver relief successfully,
simply establishing ‘a bigger [UN] force won’t work’, the general argued.
46‘Minutes for the DC Meeting on Somalia’ (20 November 1992), 1.
47See Don Oberdorfer, ‘The Path to Intervention: A Massive Tragedy “We Could Do Something About”’,
Washington Post, 6 Dec. 1992; Hirsch and Oakley, Restore Hope, 43; Lewis and Mayall, ‘Somalia’,
110–11; Western, ‘Humanitarian Intervention’, 136–7; and Rutherford, Humanitarianism, 74. The most
accurate previously published account of the meeting can be found in Cohen, Intervening, 211–12
(Cohen attended the meeting).
48‘Minutes for DC meeting’ (20 November 1992), 3.
49Ibid.
50Ibid., 4.
51Ibid.
52Ibid., 5.
53Ibid.
54Ibid., 6.
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‘You must be willing to destroy the forces that oppose food deliveries’.
Therefore, ‘there needs to be a transfer to a coalition…, and the ROE
[rules of engagement] need to change’.55 Then came the bombshell state-
ment: ‘it is resolvable by US forces, including combat troops’, McCaﬀrey
declared. ‘It is a doable mission’.56 Under this scenario, he explained, US and
coalition troops would have a ‘whack at it for three or four months, and then
set up a police force’.57 This represented a signiﬁcant about-face, after
months of insistence by the JCS that deploying US combat troops to
Somalia would be too risky and was out of the question.
Howe seemed surprised and asked the representative of the US military
for clariﬁcation: ‘Are you saying that… [the United States should] take it on
frontally, the US taking the lead, sorting it out and then leaving a UN police
force?’ McCaﬀrey replied by emphasising that the uniformed leadership had
little faith in the DOS proposal: ‘There is real skepticism that the UN will
come up with the numbers or the will to do the job… This is not even an
amateur eﬀort… The US has the capability’.58 By speaking out strongly
against the DOS proposal and underscoring the preferability and feasibility
of a US-led coalition operation followed by a UN handoﬀ after a few months,
McCaﬀrey had for all practical purposes come close to recommending such
a two-step approach. This was all the more remarkable because, as noted,
policymakers had until then hardly considered the possibility of a signiﬁcant
US troop deployment.
No decision was taken at the 20 November meeting, but Wolfowitz’s and
McCaﬀrey’s statements had dramatically shifted the terms of the debate. In
a follow-up small group meeting on 23 November, the deputies laid out
three options for the president. Option one was an expanded UN mission:
the United States would oﬀer logistical support for a ‘signiﬁcantly larger UN
force that would be prepared to deploy and operate eﬀectively even with-
out the agreement of local factions’.59 Option two was a ‘coalition of nations
[acting] under the authority of a new UN resolution’, under national rather
than UN command, but without direct participation of US troops.60 Option
three was a US-led coalition: the United States would seek ‘a new UNSC
resolution that permits the US to create, lead, and contribute the bulk of a
coalition force that would operate under UN authority but not UN com-
mand’. This last option would likely involve a ‘six month presence prior to a
hand-oﬀ to an adequately sized and equipped UN peacekeeping force’.61
55Ibid.
56Ibid.
57Ibid.
58Ibid., 6–7.
59‘Options Paper: Next Steps in Somalia’, small group meeting of DC (23 November 1992), 1.
60Ibid., 2.
61Ibid., 3.
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The deputies indicated their support for option three, noting that it ‘stands
the best chance of rapid success’.62
The military’s inﬂuence on Bush’s decision to intervene
On 25 November, Bush met with his senior foreign policy team to discuss
the Somalia options. After Powell presented the military’s plans for each of
the three options, the president approved option three in principle, invol-
ving a large US intervention force of more than 20,000 troops.63 The
decision to intervene was made contingent on (1) a UNSC mandate for
the use of force, (2) participation from other countries, and (3) the prospect
of a relatively quick handoﬀ of to a strengthened UN peacekeeping
mission.64
On 3 December, the UNSC unanimously approved Resolution 794, which
authorised the US-led coalition ‘to use all necessary means to establish… a
secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia’. That
same day, Bush convened an NSC meeting with his principal advisers and
informed them that the decision to intervene had become ﬁnal.65 On
4 December, Bush announced in a televised address to the nation that US
troops would intervene to ‘create a secure environment’ for food deliveries.
He emphasised that this would be a limited operation with a clear end
point: ‘once we have created that secure environment, we will withdraw our
troops, handing the security mission back to a regular UN peacekeeping
force’.66
How Powell convinced the president
Previous accounts have claimed that ‘the decision [to deploy US troops] was
the president’s, especially since no recommendations accompanied the
options paper’ developed by the deputies.67 In a technical sense, the
decision was of course the president’s. But the view that the options
paper developed by the deputies on 23 November included no
62Ibid.
63Oberdorfer, ‘Path to Intervention’; Rutherford, Humanitarianism, 77.
64Jeremiah informed the deputies a few days later that ‘This is an open decision pending the [UN]
resolution’. See ‘Minutes for the DC Small Group Meeting on Somalia’ (30 November 1992), 3. At
another meeting, Howe declared that ‘The president has stipulated that others [i.e., coalition
partners] come in phase one, and the second condition is that peacekeepers be in the works’. See
‘Minutes for DC Meeting on Somalia’ (2 December 1992), 2.
65The president said that Congress would be ‘briefed at 11.00am’ on the following day, and he would
‘give the speech [to the media] at noon’. See ‘Minutes of NSC Meeting on Somalia’
(3 December 1992), 5.
66George H. W. Bush, ‘Address on Somalia’, 4 December 1992, <http://millercenter.org/president/bush/
speeches/speech-3984>.
67Woods, ‘US Government Decisionmaking Process’, 158. See also Rutherford, Humanitarianism, 76.
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recommendation is incorrect. The way in which the deputies had framed the
problem and identiﬁed possible policy answers narrowed down the presi-
dent’s choice signiﬁcantly. The deputies, taking on board the Pentagon’s
concerns about immediately deploying an enlarged UN force, had recom-
mended against going forward with this option (option one) in their
23 November paper.68 Furthermore, as noted, the deputies acknowledged
in the same paper that a coalition eﬀort with US ground troops in a lead role
had the best chance of succeeding.
An annex to the 23 November options paper mentioned that ‘Option 3
action line awaits military in-put’, making it clear that the JCS needed to
provide further details regarding this option’s feasibility.69 Consequently,
whether the president would go for option two (a coalition without US
troops) or some version of option three (a US-led coalition) depended, to a
signiﬁcant degree, on what the JCS was going to recommend. A
24 November paper authored by the Joint Staﬀ acknowledged that option
two was probably unfeasible because other countries would not contribute
signiﬁcant forces unless the United States did.70 This could be read as a
cautious endorsement of option three by the military.
The key recommendation to move ahead with option three was subse-
quently made by General Powell during the 25 November White House
meeting. By highlighting the pros and cons of the various options, Powell
eﬀectively, if reluctantly, came to recommend a full-scale US intervention.71
Powell himself remembers his advice to the president that day as follows:
I said, ‘we have a plan on how to do it’. And the plan reﬂected my own view
that if the UN is going to be able to do this, then we ﬁrst had to send in
something big enough to scare the militias. It was for this reason that I
recommended to the president that we send in a large US force.72
Powell’s change of heart, backed by Secretary Cheney, appears to have
played a central role in convincing President Bush of the wisdom of immedi-
ate action by American forces. As Wolfowitz sums it up, ‘once the president
was persuaded to do this, Powell and the military loyally implemented what
we all understood to be the president’s intention. But Powell had a lot to do
with shaping the president’s view of it’.73 It seems that on this occasion, the
68The paper noted that ‘it would be diﬃcult to recruit this expanded force and would probably take a
long time’; furthermore, ‘the UN… probably does not have the [required] command and control
capability’. See ‘Options Paper: Next Steps in Somalia’, 1–2.
69‘Diplomatic Timetable for Option 2 Actions in Somalia’, annex 1 to ‘Options Paper: Next Steps in
Somalia’.
70Poole, Save Somalia, 18.
71Ordway, author interview (Ordway was present at the meeting). See also Feaver, Armed Servants, 240;
and Poole, Save Somalia, 19.
72Powell, author interview.
73Author interview with Paul Wolfowitz (undersecretary of defense for policy, 1989–93), 3 May 2017.
See also Menkhaus and Ortmayer, ‘Key Decisions’, 8.
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military did not ﬂout the civilian principals’ wishes and/or impose its own
views by political maneuvering.74 Instead, Powell and other military leaders
genuinely seem to have persuaded President Bush that a large-scale US
intervention, followed by a handoﬀ to UN peacekeepers, would be the best
course of action.75
Hypotheses on the military’s change of heart
What explains the senior oﬃcers’ recommendation to intervene, after they
had insisted for months that deploying US combat troops to Somalia was
out of the question? It appears to have been inﬂuenced by concerns that
since the United States had staked its credibility on a successful relief eﬀort,
if the UN peacekeepers came under sustained attack, American forces might
be drawn in to support them or facilitate an evacuation. In September, the
Bush administration had stationed 2100 Marines oﬀ the coast of Somalia,
announcing that the goal was to ‘provide cover’ for the UN peacekeepers.76
Thus, apart from the administration’s political commitment as a result of the
airlift, the credibility of the US military was arguably at stake. As Wolfowitz,
the Pentagon’s third-highest-ranking civilian at the time, remembers the
internal DOD conversations, ‘the idea was, if you give the UN peacekeepers
a mandate and they can’t fulﬁl the mandate, then the pressure comes on
you. There’s a credibility issue’.77
The CIA predicted that if small numbers of US forces were sent in to
support the UN operation, Aideed ‘would probably respond by engaging
them’.78 In a worst-case scenario, if the UN peacekeepers withdrew entirely,
American forces might be left with primary responsibility for stabilising
Somalia. Research shows that policymakers are more likely to opt for quick
oﬀensive action when they believe there is a high chance of armed con-
frontations involving their country’s armed forces in the near future.79 The
military, in particular, tends to favour oﬀensive action in such circumstances
because it views it as a way of ‘exercising the initiative [and] ﬁghting the war
that it [has] planned’.80 Consistent with these ﬁndings, in the Somalia case,
the JCS appears to have concluded that it would be better to move to the
oﬀensive by deploying a large US force to establish safe distribution points
74As Peter Feaver notes, in the Somalia case, ‘there was relatively little military shirking’. See Feaver,
Armed Servants, 247.
75Oﬃcers at US Central Command (CENTCOM) reportedly had reservations until the end; but once
Powell had persuaded Bush, the debate was over. On CENTCOM’s reservations, see Frank G. Hoﬀman,
‘One Decade Later – Debacle in Somalia’, Proceedings: The US Naval Institute 130/1 (2004), 67.
76Paul Lewis, ‘US Oﬀering Plan for Somali Relief’, New York Times, 18 Sept. 1992. See also Menkhaus
and Ortmayer, ‘Key Decisions’, 5.
77Wolfowitz, author interview.
78CIA, ‘Somalia: The Threat to the UN’s Pakistani Battalion’, 4.
79Robert Jervis, ‘War and Misperception’, Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18/4 (1988), 694–96.
80Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1984), 48.
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for humanitarian relief, instead of intervening reactively to defend or extract
UN peacekeepers under attack.
The US military and Chairman Powell in particular believed that the risk to
American troops could be minimised by deploying overwhelming force for a
well-deﬁned purpose. This ‘decisive force’ approach had been vindicated by
the 1991 Persian Gulf War victory, and it was subsequently enshrined in the
1992 US National Military Strategy, drafted under Powell’s guidance.81 When it
came to planning for the Somalia intervention, Bush followed Powell’s advice
to deploy a massive force: 38,000 coalition troops were ultimately deployed as
part of Operation Restore Hope, with 21,000 coming from the United States.82
Powell was conﬁdent that such a large force would intimidate the Somali
militias; consequently, expectations of US casualties were low, and in early
December, he assured Bush that US and coalition forces were unlikely to
encounter major resistance.83 It is possible that Powell thought the Somalia
intervention would further vindicate the decisive force concept and demon-
strate its applicability to non-traditional missions.84
Another, related factor that appears to have made the senior generals
and admirals more supportive of US intervention was their ability to deﬁne a
limited mission for American forces. In early November, Powell and
Wolfowitz met with Fred Cuny, a humanitarian relief expert who had been
involved in Operation Provide Comfort, the US-led humanitarian interven-
tion in northern Iraq in 1991, and who was now working as a consultant on
Somalia. Cuny made the case that ‘if you stay away from what’s politically
decisive, people won’t interfere with you too much’.85 This argument struck
a chord with the DOD leadership. Once senior Pentagon oﬃcials began to
think of the mission as simply ensuring the safe delivery of relief supplies, it
appeared more feasible. Powell was turned around, and civilian policy-
makers from other agencies began to hear that, provided US military
objectives were narrowly deﬁned, this was a ‘doable mission’. The key factor,
Wolfowitz insists, is that ‘the mission changed’ – from helping the UN
stabilise Somalia to opening up the supply routes for humanitarian relief.86
To minimise the risk of serious clashes with Somali militias, the uniformed
leaders were also adamant that American forces do not have, as their
mission, the disarmament of any of the Somali groups.87 President Bush
81Frank G. Hoﬀman, Decisive Force (Westport, CT: Praeger 1996), 100–101.
82US Army, United States Forces, Somalia: After Action Report (Washington, DC: Center of Military History
2003), 6, <http://www.history.army.mil/html/documents/somalia/SomaliaAAR.pdf>.
83‘Minutes of NSC Meeting on Somalia’ (3 December 1992), 1.
84For a useful discussion, see Hoﬀman, Decisive Force, 104–5.
85Wolfowitz, author interview.
86Ibid. See also Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia, 41. A memo authored by the NSC staﬀ at the time conﬁrms
that Powell had been ‘galvanized’ by the Cuny proposal. See Ordway, ‘Memorandum for Jonathan
Howe’, 19 November 1992.
87Author interview with Robert Gallucci (assistant secretary of state for political-military aﬀairs,
1992–94), 20 April 2011. See also Poole, Save Somalia, 23; and Bensahel, ‘Humanitarian Relief’, 33–5.
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again accepted the military’s request. Consequently, when Boutros-Ghali
told Bush during a telephone conversation on 8 December 1992 that ‘dis-
arming the gangs, and the heavy weapons, will be important’, Bush replied:
‘I agree it is important. But we have not made it part of our mission
statement’.88 (The US military’s staunch resistance to contemplating any
form of disarmament, including conﬁscation of heavy weapons, would sub-
sequently complicate the handoﬀ to UN forces).
Finally, as noted in the introduction, some authors have suggested that
Powell and other senior generals came to support a US intervention in
Somalia because they expected that this would reduce the likelihood of
US intervention in Bosnia, which the military dreaded far more.89 But this
argument is problematic. Powell was certainly opposed to US intervention in
Bosnia, and he made his opposition public in September 1992.90 However,
Operation Restore Hope, the US intervention in Somalia, was intended as a
short-term operation. As Bush declared during an NSC meeting on
3 December, ‘I expect that within 40 days troops can start coming out’.91
Even under a four- to six-month time frame, which had been the working
assumption during earlier discussions among the deputies, the plan was for
US troops to be out of Somalia by the spring of 1993.92 A US withdrawal
from Somalia by the spring of 1993 would have left the incoming Clinton
administration with ample room to intervene in Bosnia. This lends credibility
to Powell’s claim that he ‘wasn’t thinking about that, or worrying about that’
(a US intervention in Bosnia) when planning the Somalia intervention.93
A UN handoﬀ as central to the US exit strategy
After the end of the Cold War, the Bush administration had come to see UN
peacekeeping operations as a relatively low-cost means of managing gov-
ernance crises in peripheral regions of the world while limiting US liability.94
The administration, including DOD, had invested heavily in developing the
UN’s capabilities for robust peacekeeping; however, the UNOSOM experi-
ence over the course of 1992 had revealed that the world organisation
continued to face serious challenges in implementing this type of
operations.95 By the fall of 1992, senior US oﬃcials viewed the UN operation
88‘Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’, White
House, 8 December 1992.
89See esp. Western, ‘Humanitarian Intervention’, 138; but also Feaver, Armed Servants, 241.
90Michael R. Gordon, ‘Powell Delivers a Resounding No on Using Limited Force in Bosnia’, New York
Times, 28 Sept. 1992.
91‘Minutes of NSC Meeting on Somalia’ (3 December 1992), 1.
92Jeremiah insists that the plan was ‘to get out of Dodge as quickly as we can’. Jeremiah, ‘Oral history’.
93Powell, author interview.
94Cohen, Intervening, 206.
95Bowman, author interview.
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in Somalia as a test case ‘to demonstrate that the UN can act decisively in
the post-Cold War world’.96
At the same time, as noted, the American military worried that simply
beeﬁng up UNOSOM in late 1992 would be diﬃcult and might draw in US
troops under unfavourable circumstances. The JCS thus put forward the idea
of a US ‘bridging operation’. The expectation was that a large-scale US
operation, limited in time, could oﬀer the UN the necessary breathing
space to assemble a larger and more robust peacekeeping force that
would take over within months. This expectation seems to have played a
crucial role in persuading the military, and the administration more gener-
ally, to support a US intervention.97 As Scowcroft, the former national
security adviser, explains, ‘we ﬁnally hit upon this notion, well if we reopen
the food supply lines, then we can turn it over to the UN forces, and they
will be able to keep them open even though they don’t have the force to
open them’.98
The groundwork for the handoﬀ to a strengthened UN force was laid by
military planners at US Central Command (CENTCOM) and on the Joint Staﬀ,
in cooperation with Robert Gallucci’s oﬃce for political–military aﬀairs at the
State Department.99 CENTCOM planners deﬁned the desired end state for
the US operation as ‘the creation of an environment where UN and relief
organizations can assume responsibility’.100 The contingency plans that
CENTCOM had developed since early November 1992 foresaw a US opera-
tion in four phases, with phase IV involving a handoﬀ to a strengthened UN
peacekeeping force (UNOSOM II) after a period ranging from between three
to eight months.101 As Admiral Bowman recalls, from the military’s perspec-
tive ‘the UN handoﬀ was really a requirement. It was present in all the
CENTCOM plans and certainly all the Joint Staﬀ recommendations during
the interagency discussions’.102
The US military in fact sought to entrench the principle of a UN handoﬀ
in the UNSC resolution authorising the US-led intervention. At a
30 November Deputies Committee meeting, Admiral Jeremiah presented
an amendment to the draft UNSC resolution then under discussion in
New York that would have committed ‘UNOSOM [to] assume the role of
the coalition forces upon their departure’.103 Ideally, the JCS would also
96DOS, ‘The Need for Action in Somalia’, 4. See also Menkhaus and Ortmayer, ‘Key Decisions’, 6.
97Halberstam, War, 251.
98Author interview with Brent Scowcroft (national security adviser to the president, 1989–93),
22 March 2011.
99Gallucci and Bowman, author interviews.
100Harned, Stability Operations, 36.
101John Lancaster, ‘Powell Says Mission Duration is Flexible: Operation Could Take 3 Months, General
Says’, Washington Post, 5 Dec. 1992. See also Hirsch and Oakley, Restore Hope, 44; and Harned,
Stability Operations, 36.
102Bowman, author interview.
103‘Minutes for DC Small Group Meeting’ (30 November 1992), 6.
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have wanted to keep UNOSOM functioning in some form while the US-led
coalition intervened, to facilitate and speed up the subsequent transition.
Admiral Bowman was dispatched to New York to lobby the UN secretariat
on these points, but Boutros-Ghali turned down the US military’s
requests.104 UNSC Resolution 794, which authorised the US-led intervention,
simply mentioned that the Security Council would ‘make the necessary
decision’ for a transition back to UN peacekeeping based on a recommen-
dation from the secretary-general, once the latter had ascertained that
conditions were suﬃciently improved.105 In other words, there would be
no automatic handoﬀ – instead, a further UNSC resolution would be needed.
Incomplete handoﬀ and mission failure
The ﬁrst contingent of US troops from the I Marine Expeditionary Force
under the command of Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston landed on
the shores of Mogadishu on 9 December 1992.106 In the short run,
Operation Restore Hope was a success: by threatening to use overwhelming
force, the US-led coalition intimidated the Somali militias as expected. The
improved security environment allowed the UN and private relief organisa-
tions to massively step up food deliveries around Mogadishu and in south-
ern Somalia, so that ‘deaths from starvation and disease fell sharply’.107 At
the same time, because risk-averse coalition forces declined to disarm local
militias and steered clear of interference in Somali politics, they failed to
tackle the underlying sources of the humanitarian crisis.108
On 29 January 1993, General Johnston, under pressure from authorities in
Washington, declared that US troops had accomplished their mission and
recommended a transition to UNOSOM II – signiﬁcantly earlier than the original
CENTCOM plans had foreseen.109 Boutros-Ghali, however, repeatedly delayed
the transfer to UNOSOM II, insisting that the conditions were not yet right. In a
3March report to the Security Council, the UN secretary-general pointed out that
the security situation remained volatile; for that reason, he recommended a
robust mandate for the follow-on mission that ought to ‘include
disarmament’.110 Serious planning for the transfer could begin only after the
Security Council accepted this recommendation in Resolution 814 of 26March.111
104Gallucci, author interview. See also Poole, Save Somalia, 22.
105UNSC Resolution 794, para. 18.
106Harned, Stability Operations, 32.
107Boutros-Ghali, UN and Somalia, 35. See also Wheeler, Saving Strangers, 189.
108For a discussion, see Walter Clarke and Jeﬀrey Herbst, ‘Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian
Intervention’, in Clarke and Herbst (eds.), Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian
Intervention (Boulder CO: Westview 1997).
109Harned, Stability Operations, 68, and 69–74 more generally.
110Report by the UN Secretary General to the UNSC, Doc. 25,354, 3 March 1993, para. 55, 57, <https://
documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/121/56/IMG/N9312156.pdf?OpenElement>.
111US Army, ‘Somalia: After Action Report’, 74–5.
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The new US administration under President Clinton also had to compromise on
another issue: the agreement negotiated between the Bush administration and
theUN secretariat in November 1992 had committed theUnited States to leaving
a small 2500-man quick reaction force (QRF) on ships oﬀ the coast of Somalia
after the handoﬀ, to be called upon for special rescue missions; but in
March 1993, the Clinton administration had to oﬀer a beefed-up QRF and an
additional 4000 US troops for logistical support, before Boutros-Ghali agreed to
the transfer.112
The transfer ﬁnally occurred on 4 May, when UNOSOM II took over and
Operation Restore Hope was terminated. Yet the deployment of the
strengthened UN peacekeeping force was still far from complete: at the
time of the transfer, UNOSOM II comprised only about 16,000 troops –
signiﬁcantly short of its authorised strength of 28,000.113 Furthermore, the
mandate for UNOSOM II, enshrined in Resolution 814, included disarming
the Somali factions, as requested by Boutros-Ghali; but this put the UN
troops on a path of collision with Aideed, the most recalcitrant of
Somalia’s warlords.
After 24 Pakistani peacekeepers were killed in an ambush by Aideed’s
militia in June 1993, UNOSOM II began to request frequent support from
the QRF, and US forces became engaged in a manhunt for Aideed.114 In
August, lobbying by Admiral Howe, who had been appointed as the UN’s
new special envoy for Somalia, persuaded the Clinton administration to
deploy US Army Rangers and Delta Force commandos to the country,
resulting in a further escalation of the violence.115 In short, far from
achieving a smooth handoﬀ, American troops were increasingly drawn
back in, to support a mission that was now largely deﬁned at UN head-
quarters in New York.
Things came to a head on 3 October 1993, when Somali militias shot down a
US Black Hawk helicopter, Rangers sent on a rescue mission were ambushed,
and 18 US soldiers died in the ensuing ﬁreﬁght.116 A few days after the ‘Black
Hawk down’ incident, President Clinton, under strong pressure from Congress,
announced that he would pull all US troops out of Somalia over a ﬁve-month
period. The hunt for Aideed was eﬀectively over, and the UNSC formally
suspended all eﬀorts to apprehend Somali militia leaders.117 Without
American support, the UN mission was no longer viable, and Boutros-Ghali
concluded that all UN forces should be withdrawn by the spring of 1995.118
112Cohen, Intervening, 214 (on the initial commitment); and Rutherford, Humanitarianism, 108 (on
Clinton’s oﬀer).
113Boutros-Ghali, The UN and Somalia, 50, 53; Harned, Stability Operations, 75.
114Bensahel, ‘Humanitarian Relief’, 39–41.
115Feaver, Armed Servants, 243; Rutherford, Humanitarianism, 148–50.
116Halberstam, War, 261–2; Wheeler, Saving Strangers, 198.
117Rutherford, Humanitarianism, 160–65.
118Bensahel, ‘Humanitarian Relief’, 44; Lewis and Mayall, ‘Somalia’, 119–20.
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Conclusion: UN handoﬀs as part of US military doctrine
Nowadays, when American ground troops are deployed in humanitarian
crises abroad, their exit strategy typically involves a handoﬀ to UN peace-
keepers. Other Western interveners, such as Britain, France and Australia,
display a similar preference for handing oﬀ postcombat stabilisation to
follow-on UN forces.119 Such handoﬀs are attractive because they allow
the United States and other Western countries to concentrate their
advanced military capabilities on the initial enforcement phase and shift
the longer-term burden to international partners.
The US military appears to have learned valuable lessons from the
troubled experience in Somalia on how to achieve smoother UN handoﬀs
in the future. First, the handoﬀ needs to be better planned and prepared. For
Somalia, the military had developed a loose transition plan in three phases:
during Phase I, follow-on UN forces would begin to arrive and assume
responsibility for humanitarian relief, while American troops would start
leaving; during Phase II, command and control responsibilities would be
transferred to UNOSOM II; and during Phase III, all coalition forces would
withdraw.120 CENTCOM planners reportedly understood the need for precise
‘measures of eﬀectiveness’ to gauge progress ahead of the transition; how-
ever, little headway was made in identifying such measures either before or
during Operation Restore Hope.121 Indeed, the US withdrawal plan was
primarily tied to a political timetable in Washington rather than to concrete
benchmarks for measuring progress on the ground.
Following the somewhat haphazard and ultimately unsuccessful handoﬀ
in Somalia, for the next US humanitarian intervention, the 1994 operation in
Haiti, the Joint Staﬀ and US Atlantic Command (the responsible regional
command in this case) developed a matrix of speciﬁc tasks to be accom-
plished by American troops before UN peacekeepers would take over. The
goal of this matrix, prepared under the supervision of Lieutenant General
Wesley Clark, then the director for strategic plans and policy on the Joint
Staﬀ, was to ensure that US troops would leave behind a genuinely
improved security environment that the follow-on UN forces could realisti-
cally be expected to be able to manage.122 This subsequently became the
basis for Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD 56), adopted by President
Clinton in 1997, which mandated the development of integrated political–
119Britain sought a UN handoﬀ for its intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000; Australia for its intervention
in East Timor in 1999; and France for its interventions in Rwanda in 1994, Côte d’Ivoire in 2002, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2003, and more recently in Mali and the Central African
Republic.
120US Army, ‘Somalia: After Action Report’, 71.
121Harned, Stability Operations, 36.
122Author interview with Col. William Flavin (planner, US Army staﬀ, 1992–94; Director of Doctrine,
Concepts, and Training, US Army Peacekeeping Operations Institute, 1999–2013), 28 January 2011.
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military implementation plans for humanitarian interventions including
‘demonstrable milestones and measures of success’.123
Second, another lesson learned was that, to enable a smooth handoﬀ to
UN peacekeepers, the initial US intervention needs to ﬁt into a broader,
comprehensive approach aimed at tackling the underlying political sources
of the crisis. Because coalition forces in Operation Restore Hope declined to
take on politically sensitive tasks, by the time of the handoﬀ in May 1993,
many of the underlying sources of the conﬂict continued to persist. ‘The US
military’s view was, we’ll accomplish our limited military objectives and be
done’, explains Colonel William Flavin, who was involved in planning for
Restore Hope. By contrast, today, partially as a result of the experience in
Somalia, ‘the question you ask is, how are those military objectives nested
inside the overall political-military objective?’124
For Somalia, US policymakers probably placed too much hope in UN-led
political reconciliation talks scheduled for early 1993. Talks held in Addis
Ababa, Ethiopia, in March 1993 yielded an agreement among Somali faction
leaders that committed them in principle to establishing representative
political councils. This led US authorities to expect that the relatively benign
security environment established by Restore Hope would continue.125 Yet
this optimism was unwarranted. As Nora Bensahel has noted, compliance
with the Addis Ababa agreement was ‘not at all in Aideed’s interests’,
because although Aideed was the militarily dominant local player, he ‘simply
did not have the popular support necessary to guarantee a majority’ in the
representative councils.126 For the Addis Ababa agreement to have a serious
chance of success, international forces needed to marginalise Aideed mili-
tarily – as US defence leaders belatedly recognised in the summer of 1993.
Finally, the US military learned from Somalia that the United States
should obtain clearer commitments from relevant multilateral bodies that
there will indeed be a rapid handoﬀ to adequately equipped follow-on
missions. Disagreement between UN and US authorities on the objectives
of Operation Restore Hope (notably, on the subject of disarming the militias)
in late 1992 made Boutros-Ghali and his staﬀ reluctant to ﬁrmly commit to a
UN handoﬀ, and it subsequently hampered planning for the transition.
On the day before American forces landed in Somalia, Boutros-Ghali had
insisted in a letter to President Bush that without disarmament of the
factions, he did ‘not believe that it will be possible… to create conditions
in which… the task of protecting humanitarian activities can safely be
transferred’ to UN peacekeepers.127 After Bush declined to make
123PDD 56, ‘Managing Complex Contingency Operations’, White House, May 1997, <https://fas.org/irp/
oﬀdocs/pdd56.htm>.
124Flavin, author interview. See also Harned, Stability Operations, 95.
125US Army, ‘Somalia: After Action Report’, 40, 76; Poole, Save Somalia, 38.
126Bensahel, ‘Humanitarian Relief’, 38.
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disarmament part of the US-led mission, the UN secretary general repeat-
edly delayed the transfer – until the Americans accepted in UNSC Resolution
814 that disarming the militias would be part of the mandate for UNOSOM
II, with a beefed-up US QRF to support it.128
As a result of the Somalia experience, when it came to planning for the
1994 Haiti intervention, senior US generals and admirals pushed back
against the notion that one could expect ‘the UN eventually to come in’,
without having obtained a clear, agreed upon mandate up front with
guarantees concerning the handoﬀ.129 By the time President Clinton sent
US troops to Haiti in September 1994, planning for the follow-on force had
already reached an advanced stage, and in the spring of 1995, the mission
was smoothly handed oﬀ to UN forces as planned.130 Subsequent UNSC
resolutions authorising US interventions have become increasingly speciﬁc
in codifying the details of UN handoﬀs. For instance, Resolution 1497,
authorising a US-led operation in Liberia in 2003, explicitly mandated the
establishment of a ‘follow-on United Nations stabilization force’ under
regional leadership within a maximum of two months. A similar template
was adopted for the Balkans (albeit with NATO at the forefront), and for
several non-combat relief missions over the last 25 years.131
The notion that UN handoﬀs are a central component of the US exit
strategy for humanitarian interventions has taken hold within the armed
services, to the point that ‘it is now practically a doctrinal assumption’, as a
former senior defence oﬃcial explains.132 Reﬂecting this, the UN handoﬀ
idea is enshrined in the current US Army Field Manual and the Joint Doctrine
document on multinational operations.133 It nevertheless appears that the
military ‘still has issues in describing this [idea] in suﬃcient detail’.134 One
reason for the lack of more detailed doctrinal development in this ﬁeld may
be that multilateral cooperation is ultimately a matter for civilian policy-
making and, as such, lies outside the military’s purview. If we have not
witnessed a larger number of multilateral handoﬀs, however, this probably
has little to do with the lack of detail in current doctrine: the main reason
appears to be that there have not been many US humanitarian interventions
involving ‘boots on the ground’ to begin with. When such interventions do
occur, we are likely to see the US military working hard to achieve a smooth
127Boutros Boutros-Ghali, ‘Letter to President Bush’, 8 December 1992 (reprinted in Boutros-Ghali, The
UN and Somalia, 217).
128Rutherford, Humanitarianism, 108–9.
129Author interview with John Christiansen (chairman, DOD Haiti task group, 1993–97), 15 July 2009.
130See Stefano Recchia, Reassuring the Reluctant Warriors: US Civil-Military Relations and Multilateral
Intervention (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2015), 84–7.
131Ibid., chaps. 4, 5.
132Author interview with Frank Wisner (undersecretary of defense for policy, 1993–94), 16 July 2009.
133Department of the Army, ‘The Army in Multinational Operations’; and JCS, ‘Multinational Operations’.
134Col. William Flavin, email to author, 20 December 2017.
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handoﬀ to multilateral missions – following the lessons of Operation Restore
Hope.
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